There are several reasons why the pivotal battle of this phase of the Syrian war is happening in Kobani, a poor border town of around 50,000 people. Kobani was remote enough to be poorly defended at first, but sufficiently visible to represent a possible propaganda victory.
[IS] picks and chooses battles it believes it can win, in order to forestall the potentially catastrophic strategic consequences of a tactical defeat.
That’s why the militants have stayed out of Syria’s densest and deadliest urban areas in Damascus and Aleppo. Instead, the terror group is strongest in rural and underpopulated northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. […]
For a group like Islamic State that depends heavily on ideologically-motivated wealthy donors, more victories mean more funding and more recruits eager to join the “winning” side.
But the war in Syria’s cities is a war of neighborhoods and militias. Organize an attack against an enemy and you might leave your own town or neighborhood undefended. Plus, you’re attacking unfamiliar territory—territory that is highly familiar to the defenders.
Cities are not ideal for Islamic State’s methods. Earlier this year, a coalition of Syrian rebel groups blocked the jihadists from expanding westward—uniting against the Islamists and throwing them out of Aleppo.
Now Islamic State is in a bind. Any kind of offensive push into well-defended territory could result in a defeat that sours the group’s donors and makes it less attractive to new recruits.
But not attacking is equally dangerous for Islamic State. It needs victories to maintain support. And after months of fighting, the militants are running out of obvious options for reasonably easy wins.
Sad, impoverished Kobani, within sight of southern Turkey, apparently seemed perfect.
