Het financiële stelsel

Vandaag een gastbijdrage van Philip Whyte, senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

The German economy has been growing exceptionally strongly of late. In the second quarter of 2010, it expanded faster than any other economy in the G7 and faster than at any time since the country’s reunification in 1990. Industrial output is surging. The rate of unemployment has been declining for over a year and is now well below the eurozone average (let alone levels in the US). Consumer spending and business investment are picking up – and households and firms are generally less burdened with debt than their counterparts in highly leveraged economies like the UK and the US. Germany, in short, seems to have emerged strongly from the Great Recession. Indeed, some observers think it has entered a self-sustained recovery – and that it is starting to act as Europe’s ‘growth locomotive’.

If this were true, it would be welcome. Over the past decade, Germany has not been a great source of demand for the world or the European economy: in real terms, domestic demand is only about 3 per cent higher now than it was back in 2000. For most of the noughties, Germany was structurally reliant on exports for its economic growth: without debt-fuelled spending elsewhere in the world economy, it would barely have grown at all. So any sign of a sustained recovery in German domestic demand would be good news for the country itself and the rest of the world. Not only would it reduce Germany’s reliance on unsustainable (and hence destabilising) foreign profligacy. It would also allow the eurozone and the world economy to rebalance at a higher level of output and employment than otherwise.