Weinig bereikt op eurotop

De eurotop lijkt succesvol, ondanks het machteloze gestamp van Engeland. Toch zijn de echte problemen nog steeds niet aangepakt, denkt onderzoeker Simon Tilford. Misschien zijn de problemen juist vergroot door nog meer politieke instabiliteit te veroorzaken.

The UK’s decision to marginalise itself by vetoing a new EU-27 treaty has dominated the post-summit media coverage. And for good reason – it could prove a big step towards UK withdrawal from the EU. However, the bigger question is whether the agreement reached at the summit will do anything to address the fundamentals of the euro crisis.

Unfortunately, the news on this point is just as bad. This summit will go down as yet another missed opportunity. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the summit suggests that policy-makers have not yet taken on board the seriousness of the eurozone’s predicament. There was no agreement to close any of the institutional gaps in the eurozone, such as the lack of either a real fiscal union or a pan-eurozone backstop to the banking sector. There was no agreement to boost the firepower of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), while the move to beef up the IMF’s finances fall far short of what is needed. As a result, there is little to prevent a further deepening of the crisis.

What has been agreed falls far short of a ‘fiscal union’. There will be no joint debt issuance, no shared budget, and no mechanism to transfer monies between the participating countries. Essentially, the agreement hard-wires pro-cyclical fiscal austerity into the institutional framework of the eurozone, with no quid quo pro in terms of a commitment to move gradually to debt mutualisation. It is little more than a revamped version of the EU’s existing Stability and Growth Pact. The market reaction has been less than euphoric – bond spreads have jumped sharply. Italian yields have risen back to close to 7 per cent.

This is unsurprising. Fiscal austerity alone will not solve the crisis. Indeed it has become part of the crisis. Such a strategy has already failed in Greece and Portugal and it threatens to make a bad situation in Spain and Italy even worse. What the eurozone needs is economic growth, and this agreement further worsens the outlook for that. The eurozone economy is facing a deep recession, and mounting signs of a credit crunch across much of its southern flank, as capital flight gains momentum. To adhere doggedly to a crisis strategy centred on the single pillar of fiscal austerity risks causing a further erosion of investor confidence.

But does the agreement at least give the Germans cover to back more substantive solutions to the crisis, such as debt mutualisation? So far, there is little indication of any thaw in the German opposition to debt mutualisation (‘eurobonds’), but a tough fiscal regime could potentially make it easier for the German government to accept, in principle, the case for eurobonds. The problem is that the longer the crisis goes on, the riskier eurobonds become for Germany economically and hence politically: the bigger the crisis, the larger the impact debt mutualisation would have on Germany’s own borrowing costs, and the larger the obstacles the government would face in trying to sell eurobonds to voters.

And does the agreement provide sufficient cover for the ECB to step up its buying of struggling eurozone countries’ government bonds?

The ECB has stepped up support for the eurozone’s battered banking sector. For example, the ECB has increased liquidity support for the banks: among other measures, banks will be able to borrow from the ECB on longer maturities. But there is no indication that the ECB will dramatically increase its bond buying or set targets for member-states’ borrowing costs. There was apparently strong opposition on the ECB’s governing council to the provision of additional support to the banking sector. For the time being it seems unlikely that the governing council will sanction the scale of bond-buying needed to dispel fears of default. The bank certainly could not intervene indefinitely, anyway. ECB action would need to be accompanied by institutional reforms, in particular a move to mutualise debt. In the absence of that, large-scale bond buying would quickly erode the ECB’s credibility.

The eurozone appears to be little nearer to striking the ‘grand bargain’ needed to secure the future of the single currency. Germany continues to believe that investor confidence can be won back through the imposition of legal regulations. But stability cannot be achieved through regulation. At a time when the European economy faces an acute risk of depression, the eurozone still has no economic growth strategy. Eurozone governments also failed to agree to set aside more money for the EFSF and all the indications are that the ECB will remain cautious.

So the summit has failed to bring any short-term reassurance to investors and done nothing to close any of the eurozone’s institutional gaps. It has set the scene for a new and even more dangerous phase of the crisis. Politics might still come to rescue of the single currency, but the omens are not good.

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    De vrijblijvendheid van het stabiliteitspact is ingeruild voor een verplichte begrotingsdiscipline. Binnen de huidige Europese verhoudingen is dat toch een stap. Absoluut niet genoeg. Maar het feit dat een meerderheid de eisen van Cameron ten gunste van Britse banken heeft afgewezen om dit te kunnen bereiken kan een keerpunt blijken te zijn. Tot nu toe gold de ongeschreven regel: alle regeringsleiders moeten met een voor hun eigen positie positieve boodschap thuis kunnen komen. Dat recht hebben de Europese leiders hun collega nu ontzegd. Da’s niet niks

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    De begrotingstekorten zijn een sluitpost, de belangrijkste grootheid echter is het handelstekort van Griekenland, Portugal en Spanje. Daardoor is het vrijwel onmogelijk begrotingsevenwicht te hebben. Sleutelen aan het begrotingstekort zonder iets aan je concurrentievermogen te doen heeft vrijwel geen zin. Je kan die landen beter helpen duurzame oplossingen te bedenken (energie en spullen) zodat ze er in de export wat mee kunnen verdienen. Dat betekent eerder het stúren van middelen (in de vorm van scholing, infrastructuur en financiering) dan het afpakken ervan in de vorm van een absurde boete.

    De begrotingstekorten in Griekenland financieren de export van Duitsland. Als dit problematisch wordt bevonden dan moet er iets aan de handelsbalans worden gedaan. Het begrotingstekort terugdringen is symptoombestrijding die Noord- en Zuid Europa onnodige pijn gaat bezorgen.

    http://www.ftm.nl/original/schuld-boete-en-lege-glazen.aspx

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    Exact. Daar komt nog eens bij dat de noordelijke landen ook nog eens flink gaan bezuinigen waardoor de concurrentiepositie alleen maar nog meer op scherp wordt gesteld. Het slaat echt allemaal nergens op wat er is besloten.