Trouw onderneemt per direct stappen om berichtgeving Griekenland te verbeteren

Maar niet heus.

Na wat geneuzel over ‘Griekse spelletjes’, deadlines en de vreeswekkende POETIN (maar uiteraard niets over bijvoorbeeld fiscal multipliers of zelfs maar het nut c.q. effect van verdere bezuinigingen) is dit waar de ‘kwaliteitskrant’ mee aankomt:

Wat denkt u: is het tijd voor een Grexit?

Stuur uw reactie van circa 150 woorden uiterlijk dinsdag 12 uur naar [email protected], voorzien van naam en adres. Een keuze uit de antwoorden verschijnt woensdag.

In plaats van dat Trouw een ter zake kundige economieredacteur een stuk laat schrijven, krijgen we lezersreacties. Nog erger: zelfs al zouden die lezers wat zinnigs te melden hebben, het onderwerp is simpelweg te complex om in 150 woorden uit te leggen.

Dus dan krijg je een verzameling meningen waardoor je als lezer per definitie niet beter geïnformeerd raakt.

Kortom: Trouw, een krant met de mogelijkheid iets zinnigs aan de berichtgeving toe te voegen, besluit zijn lezers opzettelijk dom te houden.

Overigens komt econoom Simon Wren-Lewis hier met een aardige bijdrage over, onder andere, de verhouding tussen de consensus onder economen en wat de (Britse) media aan berichtgeving doen:

This is why, among economists with expertise, there is a clear majority view that fiscal austerity is significantly contractionary in a liquidity trap. […]

As far as the media is concerned […] [w]hen I have talked to journalists who have some freedom to report the facts rather than what their editors want them to report, the argument I most often hear is that because this issue is political, they have to report it as a ‘debate’ come what may. […] As for the public, the word sheep is his not mine. Would [Robert Peston] really argue that the public are independently well informed on these matters, or unaffected by the media’s presentation of this and similar issues?

Het lijkt me niet dat de zaken hier anders liggen.

Open waanlink

  1. 1

    Onze Michel gaf in al aan dat mercantilisme ten grondslag ligt aan de eurocrisis en niet Griekenland.
    Een paar maanden daarvoor beschreef Heiner Flassbeck de rol van de Duitse pers:

    The Euro Crisis and Germany’s Collective Denial of the Truth: :

    – Twist and turn it however you want, Germany’s blatant violations of EMU regulations can no longer be covered up. Those, such as Der Spiegel, stay far from the truth even if they do not lie outright. When will Der Spiegel inform its readers of the simple truth that the Germany’s mercantilist economic model is based on undercutting its trading partners so that it accumulates surpluses while creating deficits and debt everywhere else? When will the ‘truth commission’ of Der Spiegel – seventy people in total – understand that only a deterioration of German competitiveness (through rising wages) and declining surpluses vis-à-vis its trading partners can help to overcome deflation and stimulate economic growth of all countries inside EMU? It does not seem likely that this will happen in the foreseeable future; the collective fear to face the truth is insurmountable.

    (…) Example: in an interview in past week’s printed edition of Der Spiegel, Wolfgang Kauder, the leader of the CDU/CSU party group in the German Bundestag, said: ‘If Greece wants more money from its European partners, it must pass reforms. Perhaps it helps to realise that it is not the European bailout policy that has driven Greece into misery, but the failure of their own elites.’ If someone makes a statement like this, you would expect that any professional journalist would question why only recently the economic policy of the country has led to such despair among the Greek people and, hence, resulted in the election of the ‘left populists’ (Kauder on SYRIZA) into power. If it is indeed the Greek elites who are responsible for the cataclysm in Greece, why is it that the Troika’s infamous memoranda since 2010 (the memoranda of understanding according to the wording of the IMF) literally spell out the policies that a country has to abide by, including the reduction of wages, pensions and social welfare? Mr. Kauder does not deny the truth, but reality itself. The interviewer, however, remained silent. –

    Ondertussen vergeleek Rob de Wijk een maand geleden in Trouw Griekse leiders met die van Noord Korea: weggezongen van de realiteit, onbereikbaar voor compromissen, bla, bla, bla. Trouw kan de pot op.

  2. 3

    ECB president ‘blew up’ at plan that could have solved the Greek crisis in 2010

    A conflict that “blew up” within and between the institutions negotiating Greece’s 2010 bailout may have played a pivotal role in blocking efforts to ease the country’s debt burden, according to a new paper. The implication of the paper is that the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the IMF screwed up in 2010 by failing to allow a restructuring of Greek debt that would have avoided the current crisis.

    Read more:

    Uit genoemde paper een aantal interessante stukken:

    – Among economists, there is widespread agreement that Greece’s debt should have been restructured much sooner, with some contending that 2010 would have been the ideal time. A case can be made that because of the delay in dealing decisively with Greece’s debt, the euro-zone crisis overall was more severe and prolonged than it ought to have been. Indisputably, the bailout proved a boon to many European banks, which received payment in full and on time on tens of billions of euros worth of Greek bonds in 2010, 2011 and early 2012. Their gains, however, were essentially subsidized by taxpayers who had to bear the burden and the risk of the official loans extended to Athens. – (zoiets was in 2002 al te lezen bij FT, Forbes, Zero Hedge).

    Daar waar jij, Jeroen, in het vorige stuk over fiscal multipliers, verwijst naar de biecht van Christine Lagarde, vlecht ze er toch weer een leugen in:

    – Beyond the rightness or wrongness of the IMF’s approach is another controversy about what the Fund actually did. The Fund issued a post-mortem in mid-2012 acknowledging a number of its own mistakes in the first Greek rescue, notably over-optimistic growth assumptions. The report also pointed the finger at European officials for the length of time Greece remained laden with excessive debt, asserting: “An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece although this was not acceptable to the euro partners” (IMF 2013). That contention drew outraged rebuttals from Brussels and Frankfurt, with a number of officials accusing the Fund of historical revisionism. “‘I do not recall the IMF’s managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn proposing early debt restructuring,’ Rehn said, ‘but I do recall that Christine Lagarde was opposed to it.’” (Rehn quoted in Spiegel and Hope 2013. Lagarde succeeded Strauss-Kahn in mid-2011). –

  3. 4

    Lagarde zat gewoon op een lijn met Sarkozy en vooral Trichet:

    – Greece’s place on the spectrum was on the insolvency end, according to the data Lorenzo Giorgianni, deputy director of Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (SPR ) of IMF, at the hotel meetings, which is called a “debt sustainability analysis.” The details of this one remain secret, but like any debt sustainability analysis, it projected what would happen to Greece’s
    debt-to-GDP ratio under various assumptions regarding economic growth, the government’s ability to run fiscal surpluses, interest rates and so on. These simulations indicated that Greece’s chances of falling into explosive debt dynamics were uncomfortably high, implying that it was time to consider a
    restructuring. Such a conclusion simply was not tolerable to Europe’s senior-most leaders, the most implacable of whom was the ECB’s Trichet. The issue arose at an ECB meeting in the spring of 2010, when Jürgen Stark, a member of the six-person executive board, argued that Greece’s debt was unsustainable,
    and that therefore the solution should include losses for private creditors.

    The ECB president “blew up,” according to one attendee. “Trichet said, ‘We are an economic and monetary union, and there must be no debt restructuring!’” this person recalled. “He was shouting.”-

    En om op Heiner Flassbeck inzake mercantilisme terug te komen (althans hoe te bestrijden; Flassbeck wil naar een inflatie van 2% in de kernlanden om de landen in de periferie op termijn meer concurrerender te maken; maar het volgende
    bestrijdt mercantilisme m.i. op een andere manier):

    For the IMF to have been junior partner in the Troika was a travesty. Even though the Fund was putting up a minority share of the funding for the Greek program, it should have had the clearly understood power to determine the terms and conditions. Indeed, the Fund’s authority should have gone even further. It
    should have been able to set terms and conditions for the entire euro zone. It should have been on the opposite side of the negotiating table from the ECB rather than the same side, and it should have had the power to require action
    from all of the member countries, not just the ones urgently in need of international assistance. The Fund was coming to the rescue not just of Greece, but of the euro; even the rich countries that never needed IMF money were, in many respects, supplicants, using the Fund to help save their terribly flawed
    system of monetary union.

    Politically unrealistic as that may sound, the case has been advocated by none other than Edwin “Ted” Truman, a battle-hardened veteran of financial diplomacy from his decades at the Federal Reserve and US Treasury, now with the Peterson
    Institute for International Economics. As Truman (2013) has written: “The IMF should have insisted as part of the first program for Greece that the other members of the euro area adopt a complementary strategy as a condition for its approval of the Greek program,” but the Fund “was too timid, paralyzed or
    conflicted to require such steps.” In Truman’s trenchant words, “The members of the euro area wanted to preserve the euro, but they were not prepared to accept conditionality applied to the euro area as a single entity. The rest of the world, to its regret, allowed the Europeans have it both ways — save the euro
    but by imposing all the policy conditions only on the countries in crisis.”

    (Tja, gewaagd, maar het moet toch ergens vandaan komen. Ergens in het stuk staat nog dat er toch iets of iemand moet zijn die, als het nodig is, de koppen van Europese leiders tegen elkaar kan slaan …)

    Paul Blustein-“Laid Low: The IMF, the Eurozone and the first rescue of Greece”

  4. 5

    Trouw, of om ’t even welk ander dagblad in ons land, goede journalistieke beschouwingen zitten er niet in.

    Het zijn propaganda kanalen, beter dan destijds in de USSR. Dáár had niemand twijfels over de leugenmedia. Onze leugenmedia doen dat werk veel succesvoller. Bijna niemand die onze leugenmedia als zodanig herkent.

    De NOS gaf destijds gewoon de ‘Video Press Releases’ (de in de studio gemaakte ‘Koeweit couveuse baby’s propaganda) door. Het was een Amerikaanse PR-firma die voor het produceren van dit ‘nieuws’ c.q. ‘Video Press Release’ was ingehuurd door het Pentagon. En alle dagbladen namen het klakkeloos over.

    Het is dan ook niet ver gezocht om te concluderen dat de meeste redacties onder controle staan van 1 of ander ‘veiligheidsdienst’.

    Alhoewel de NYT ook regelmatig te betrappen is op propaganda, geldt dat niet voor alle columnisten en (redactionele) artikelen. Zoals onlangs het artikel van Paul Kruger over de humanitaire ellende die het IMF willens en wetens aanricht in Griekenland.

    Wetenschappelijk onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat het overgrote deel van de papiervulling in onze dagbladen weinig of totaal niet geredigeerde persberichten van belanghebbenden betreft.

    Een goede krant zou tenminste beginnen de doelstellingen van het IMF erbij te halen.
    Niet, zoals de propaganda doet geloven, de welvaart te verhogen.
    In navolging van het Marshall Plan heeft het IMF de taak globalisering te bespoedigen en vervolmaken (het 4de Rijk).
    IMF is voor economie wat de NAVO is voor soevereine landen.

    Zelfs ik heb lang gedacht dat DSK een schuinsmarcheerder is. Inmiddels is wel duidelijk dat hij de duivelse plannen van het IMF niet met z’n geweten kon rijmen. Hij is ‘kalt gestellt’.
    Het IMF kan alleen uit de voeten met harteloze sadisten.

    Kijk, dit is nieuws – mbt. Griekenland!:
    Soros, een fouter dan foute gast. Totaal onbetrouwbaar. Maar je kunt maar beter goed de signalen die deze machtige, zo niet machtigste, persoon op aarde afgeeft: ‘de ECD voert rampzalig beleid’:
    soros ECB QE means inequality and asset bubbles:

    Nog zo’n deskundige bron, prima inkijk in wat de dagbladen ons verzwijgen – mbt de plundering van Griekenland, en de hele EU:

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